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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Francis A. Heroux*
Defendant Had Right To Resist Arrest-The
defendant, who ran a rooming house, claimed she
had an agreement with one of her tenants under
which he gave her the keys, title and possession of
his automobile and she, in turn, agreed to act as
his chauffeur when he requested her to do so. The
roomer later backed out of the arrangement, and
when the defendant refused to return the car the
roomer called the police. After hearing both sides,
the police officer decided that the landlady was in
error and ordered her to give up the car or he would
arrest her for disorderly conduct. She forcefully
resisted his attempt to give the roomer possession
of the car and was arrested. The disorderly conduct
charge was dismissed, but the defendant was convicted for resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals
of Ohio reversed, holding that since the arrest was
unlawful, the defendant had the right to protect
her property and resist unlawful arrest by the "use
of such force as may be necessary." City of Columbus v. Holmes, 152 N.E. 2d 301 (1958).
The court indicated that the proper remedy for
the roomer to pursue was an action for replevin.
This being so, the officer had no authority "to
settle a private dispute over the right to possession
of personal property."
Denial Of Counsel by the Police Does Not
Violate Due Process-The defendant was arrested
for the murder of his paramour. He was taken to
police headquarters and questioned several times
intermittently. During this period he requested
that he be allowed to call an attorney for legal
counsel but this request was denied. Subsequently,
the defendant made a written confession of the
crime. Then he was allowed to call his lawyer.
Upon his conviction for murder, the defendant
appealed and argued that his confession was involuntary and that the denial of immediate legal aid
violated due process. The United States Supreme
Court held that the use of a voluntary confession
made by the defendant after the denial of his
request to contact his attorney while in police
custody did not violate the principle of funda* Senior law
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mental fairness. Crooker v. State, 78 S. Ct. 1287
(1958).
The majority opinion referred first to the defendant's claim that the confession admitted into
evidence over his objection had been coerced from
him by state authorities. This contention depended
almost entirely on the denial of the defendant's
request for an opportunity to engage counsel.
However, the Court pointed out that while coercion is more likely in cases of denial of counsel, it is
not always the result. Therefore, the circumstances
are important to determine the fact of coercion and
such a conclusion is negated in this case by the age,
intelligence and education of the defendant. He
was thirty-one years of age, a college graduate and
he had spent one year in law school. Thus, he knew
his rights and knew of his privilege to remain
silent. On this record the majority was able to
conclude that the confession was voluntary.
The defendant's second contention was that
even if the confession was voluntary, its use was in
violation of due process just by reason of the fact
he had been denied counsel. The Court accepted
the fact that the right of an accused to counsel for
his defense was of significant importance for the
preservation of liberty. This right includes not only
the right to have counsel at one's trial on the merits
but also the right to have counsel for any part of
the pretrial proceedings. However, a denial of
counsel only offends due process if the defendant
is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent
trial with an absence of the fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice.
The petitioner, however, sought a stricter rule
so that every state denial of a request to contact
counsel would be an infringement of constitutional
rights without any regard to the circumstances
involved. The Court rejected this proposal, pointing out that such a rule would make the denial bf
immediate counsel a complete bar to conviction.
Furthermore, this rule would effectively preclude
any police questioning of a suspect-whether fair
or unfair. The court concluded that this was not a
requirement of due process.
Four judges of the Court dissented because they
felt that the right to have the assistance of counsel
is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to
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indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial. Moreover, the
dissent stated that if the right to counsel extends to
pretrial proceedings as well as to the trial itself, it
should also be extended to restrain the coercive
power of the police and the possible evil of the
"third degree." "A person accused of a crime needs
a lawyer right after his arrest probably more than
at any other time." Therefore, the dissenters concluded that the due process clause demands that
the accused who wants a counsel should have one
at any time after the moment of arrest.
Two other Supreme Court cases to the same
effect as the majority opinion in the instant case
are: Cicenia v. La Gay, 78 S. Ct. 1297 (1958), and
Ashdown v. Utah, 78 S. Ct. 1354 (1958).

there is probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the petitioner has
committed it. The protection afforded by this
Rule, when it is viewed against its constitutional
background, is that the inferences from the facts
which lead to the complaint must be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of uncovering crime. When the
complaint in this case is judged with these considerations in mind, it is clear that it must fail
because it does not provide any basis for the Commissioner's determination under Rule 4 that probable cause existed. The complaint recited no more
than the elements of the crime charged and this is
not sufficient for a finding of probable cause. In
conclusion the Court stated: "Indeed, if this complaint were upheld, the substantive requirements
would be completely read out of Rule 4, and the
complaint would be of only formal significance
entitled to perfunctory approval by the Commissioner. This would not comport with the protective
purposes which a complaint is designed to achieve."

Complaint Not Stating Probable Cause Is Insufficient-An agent of the Federal Narcotics
Bureau was informed that the petitioner was
carrying on illegal activities. Going on this information, he obtained a warrant for the arrest of
the petitioner from the United States Commissioner in Houston, Texas. This warrant, issued
under Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of
Police Must Announce Purpose Before Breaking
Criminal Procedure was based on a written com- Into Home-The defendant was suspected by the
plaint, sworn to by the agent. The complaint police of being a dope peddler. In an effort to
stated that the petitioner concealed heroin with apprehend him, the police arranged for a contact
knowledge of its illegal importation.
man to buy narcotics from him with marked
The agent served the warrant and arrested the money. By keeping the defendant under surveilpetitioner, who at the time was carrying on his lance, the police were certain that the purchase had
person a quantity of heroin. At his trial the peti- been made in the defendant's apartment, and,
tioner moved to suppress as evidence the use of the following this lead, they closed in on him early one
heroin seized incident to the arrest-his theory morning. The police knocked on his apartment door
being that the arrest was improper. The trial court and he
inquired, "Who's there?" They replied in a
denied this motion and the petitioner appealed.
•low voice, "Police." The defendant opened the
The United States Supreme Court, with three
door that had on it an attached door chain and
judges dissenting, reversed the petitioner's conasked what the men were doing there. Before they
viction, holding that, under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a complaint merely charging responded he attempted to close the door. The
the concealment of heroin with knowledge of its officers ripped off the door chain and entered. The
illegal importation in violation of designated police searched the apartment, finding-the marked
statute and containing no affirmative allegations money and narcotics, and then arrested the
upon which a finding of probable cause could be defendant.
At his trial, the defendant sought to suppress the
made did not provide a sufficient basis upon which
such a finding could be made and did not authorize use of the marked money as evidence. The lower
court denied this motion, but the United States
a United States commissioner to issue a; warrant
of arrest for the petitioner. Giordenello v. United Supreme Court held that the arrest and the search
were unlawful because the police broke the door of
States, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958).
In reaching its decision the Court said that Rule the defendant's home without first giving notice of
4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure their authority and purpose in demanding admisdemands that a complaint must demonstrate that sion. Miller v. United States, 78 S. Ct. 1190 (1958).

